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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR USEFUL ARTICLES:
CAN THE DESIGN OF AN OBJECT BE CONCEPTUALLY
SEPARATED FROM THE OBJECT'S FUNCTION?
I. INTRODUCTION
If created today, would Michelangelo's David be afforded copy-
right protection? To what extent, if at all, should the purpose for
which David was created, and its primary function, carry any
weight in determining whether such protection should be granted?
Under the Copyright Act of 1976,' pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
tural works constitute proper subject matter for copyright protec-
tion.2 On the other hand, "useful articles," that is articles having an
"intrinsic utilitarian function," do not receive copyright protection.3
What, then, happens to copyright protection when "sculptural"
forms are put to "utilitarian" ends, or alternatively, when "useful
articles" encompass "sculptural" forms? Do the utilitarian aspects
bootstrap their way to protection because the article contains sculp-
tural aspects that are copyrightable? Or, are the sculptural aspects of
a useful article not protected because these aspects are part of an
unprotected work?
Rather than completely denying or affording protection for use-
ful articles which contain pictorial, graphic, or sculptural elements,
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1991).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1991). The Copyright Act provides the author of the work
with exclusive rights, such as (1) the right to reproduce the copyrighted work; (2) the right to
prepare derivative works; (3) the right to distribute copies of the work, transfer ownership of
the work, rent, lease, or lend the work; (4) the right to perform the work publicly; and (5) the
right to display the work publicly. Id. § 106. These exclusive rights are subject to exceptions,
most notably, fair use. In simplistic terms, fair use entitles others to use a portion of a copy-
righted work for scholarly use. See id. § 107.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1991). The Copyright Act defines "useful articles" as those objects
which have an "intrinsic utilitarian function." Id. The simplest definition of a "useful article"
is what the lay person considers a "product," the purpose or function of which goes beyond the
product's mere appearance. In other words, products having a "use" beyond aesthetic pleasure
are "useful articles" having an "intrinsic utilitarian function." Thus, a television set is a useful
article in that it receives and displays visual images. Although the visual images may be pleas-
ing to the eye, the intrinsic quality of the television is in its utilitarian function of receiving and
displaying the visual images, not in the visual images themselves. Nor is the shape or design of
the television its intrinsic function, even though the shape may be very pleasing. Thus, in the
Copyright Act, Congress was distinguishing between function and appearance. Typical useful
articles include automobiles, refrigerators, clothing, and telephones. See H.R. REP. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667.
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Congress determined that the copyrightable work embodied in a use-
ful article is protected." When artistic forms are incorporated into
useful articles, the Act provides that the artistic elements of the use-
ful article may be copyrighted to the extent that the artistic elements
are "separable" from, and are capable of existing "independently" of
the utilitarian aspects of the work.'
At first blush, this test seems simple. In determining what as-
pects of a useful article are subject to protection, all that the Copy-
right Office or a court has to do is separate the artistic parts from the
utilitarian parts, and then grant protection to the separated artistic
parts. This test would, in fact, be simple if it hinged only on the
physical separation of the artistic elements from the utilitarian ele-
ments of the article. However, such simplicity is not found in copy-
right law. In determining separability, Congress has also properly
declared that the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural aspects of the use-
ful article could either be "physically or conceptually" separable
from the utilitarian elements of the useful article for protection to be
granted to the artistic features.' Physical separability poses no real
problem, for if the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural element can be
physically taken from the useful article without affecting the func-
tioning of the useful article, then that which is separated is pro-
tected.7 The more difficult issue is determining what is meant by
conceptual separability.
Since the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, courts have
struggled to define "conceptual separability," and have thus far
failed to create a satisfactory or workable test for determining
4. The 1976 Copyright Act defines "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" to include:
[T]wo-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied
art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams,
models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans. Such works shall
include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as
defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are
capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1991).
5. Id.
6. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 55.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1991). Physical separation in the most fundamental case would
occur, for example, in a table lamp for which the stem had a decoration attached to it. The
decoration could be physically removed from the lamp, while the structural parts of the lamp
(base, shaft, wiring, etc.) remained intact. Since the decorative stem is completely unnecessary
for the functioning of the lamp and could be physically removed, the stem would meet the test
for physical separability. See infra notes 6-7, 23-33 and accompanying text.
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whether conceptual separability has been met by particular elements
of a useful article. In addition, copyright scholars have noted the
complexity and difficulty of this issue,' but have provided little guid-
ance for courts to construct a plausible test that will protect only the
artistic elements of a useful article, without extending protection to
the article's utilitarian features.9
The purpose of this comment is to examine the shortcomings of
the judicial decisions involving conceptual separability. As discussed
below, the reasoning expressed in the relevant decisions fails to pro-
tect many "authors" of an otherwise copyrightable work that has a
utilitarian function. That is, works which would normally pass the
test for copyright protection fail simply because the work has been
presented in, or has had applications as a useful article. Through an
analysis of legislative history and judicial interpretation, this com-
ment highlights the conflicting, subjective, and unworkable tests cre-
ated by the judiciary"0 and legal scholars." The comment then pro-
poses a test which avoids the pitfall of requiring judges to make
artistic value judgments.
Under the 1976 Act, no one would question that if Michelan-
gelo had recently completed work on David, the sculpture would be
afforded copyright protection. 2 What if, instead of creating David
solely for "artistic" purposes, Michelangelo created David as a life-
size mannequin, (albeit an expensive mannequin), and David was
not presented in a museum, but instead in a department store to
8. See I MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08
(1991); 1 PAUl. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 2.11 (1991).
9. A test espoused by one copyright scholar has in fact guided one court in the applica-
tion of the conceptual separability language. Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial
Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707 (1983).
Denicola's test was applied in Brandir Int'l Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142
(2d Cir. 1987). For discussion of this case see infra notes 183-94 and accompanying text.
10. See discussion infra parts II.B., IILA-C.
11. See discussion infra parts II.B.2, 1II.B-C.
12. Under the Copyright Act, for any work to receive copyright protection, it must meet
the originality and fixation requirements. Originality is not defined in the Act, but has been
judicially defined as the work owing its origin to the author, but contains no requirement that
the work be substantially original. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239 (1903). Fixation is defined in the Act as:
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of
sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is "fixed" for purposes of
this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its
transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1991).
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display clothing? Under the prevailing tests, it would be impossible
to conceptually separate the "artistic" copyrightable elements from
the "utilitarian" elements. As a result, copyright protection would
not be available for David, a result not intended by the Copyright
Act."3 To ensure copyright protection for future artistic works, a new
test must be developed.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution of Protection for Applied Art Prior to the 1976
Act
1. The Origin of Separability
Just before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909," in
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.," 5 the Supreme Court
was faced with the issue of whether an artistic work is copyrightable
when its primary purpose and function is that of a useful article."
At issue was a painted advertisement for a circus which defendant
copied. Plaintiff sued for infringement and defendant contended that
infringement did not occur because advertisements were not proper
subject matter for copyright protection." The Supreme Court held
that simply because an article's primary function is utilitarian in na-
ture, the article is not barred from copyright protection. 8 In assert-
ing that copyright protection is not dependent upon an article's artis-
tic value, Justice Holmes drew what should be an incontrovertible
line, stating, "[iut would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside the narrowest and most obvi-
ous limits."1 9
The 1909 Act was enacted shortly thereafter. Under the 1909
Act, protection was made available for "[w]orks of art; models or
designs for works of art."20 In implementing the Act, the Copyright
Office wavered as to whether protection should be afforded to the
13. Under the Act, sculptural forms are protected. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1991); See
NIMMER, supra note 8, §§ 1.08[B], 1.08[F].
14. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216, amended by 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1978) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1991)).
15. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251-52.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) (1909), amended by 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1978) (current ver-
sion at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1991)).
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applied arts or only to the fine arts. The Office ultimately accepted
utilitarian objects for copyright but at the same time adopted regula-
tions that rejected such registration. 1 Finally, in 1948, the Copy-
right Office changed its view on this matter and formally determined
that works of art include "works of artistic craftsmanship, insofar as
their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are
concerned." 2"
The only time that the Supreme Court has directly faced the
issue of the copyrightability of artistic aspects in a useful article was
in Mazer v. Stein."' Mazer involved copyright protection for table
lamps, wherein the base of the lamps were sculptural figures in the
shape of both male and female dancing figures made of semivitreous
china.24 Respondents had copyrighted the bases separately from the
other parts of the lamp as "works of art" under the 1909 Act,2" and
controversy ensued as to whether the statuettes' protection subsisted
when the statuettes were subsequently used as lamp bases by adding
electric wiring, sockets and lamp shades." Petitioner copied the lamp
bases and petitioned for review of the court of appeals' decision up-
holding the copyright in the bases.2 7
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court summarized the issue
in the following manner: "Stripped down to its essentials, the ques-
tion presented is: Can a lamp manufacturer copyright his lamp ba-
ses?"2 8 The Court emphasized that the issue actually involved the
artist's right to copyright art work intended to be used for lamp ba-
ses, as opposed to a manufacturer's right to register the lamp base.29
Another issue raised by petitioner was whether copyright protection
was available for works of art that are mass-produced."0 The Court
rejected petitioner's claim that mass-produced works of art are not
protected by interpreting the deletion of the fine arts clause of the
1870 Act to mean the end of the verbal distinction between works of
21. Rules and Regulations for the Registration of Claims to Copyright, Copyright Of-
lice Bulletin, No. 15, 8 (1910), reprinted in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 213 n.23 (1954).
See Shira Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful Arti-
cles, 34 J. COPYmIGHT Stx.'Y 339, 342-43 (1989).
22. 37 C.F.R. § 202.8 (1949).
23. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
24. Id. at 202.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) (1909), amended by 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1978).
26. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 202.
27. Id. at 203-04.
28. Id. at 205.
29. Id.
30. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 204-05.
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the fine arts and works of applied art."1 The Court noted that works
of applied art are afforded copyright protection, "in so far as their
form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned." 82
After determining the threshold question of whether mass-produced
works of art may be copyrighted, the Court held that the statuettes
were copyrightable since the statuettes represented a form of artistic
craftsmanship, and were not part of the mechanical or utilitarian
aspects of the lamp. 3
Responding to the Mazer decision, the Copyright Office in 1957
developed regulation 202.10(c)34 which was subsequently adopted in
the 1976 House Report regarding protection of useful articles.35
Federal regulation, section 202.10(c) stated that if "the sole intrinsic
function of an article is its utility, the fact that it is unique and at-
tractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art."3 Three years
later, the Copyright Office amended this regulation by deciding that
artistic features of a useful article could obtain protection, provided
that such features, "can be identified separately and are capable of
existing independently as a work of art."37 It was this amended ver-
sion of the regulation 8 which made separability a crucial element in
determining which aspects of, and to what extent useful articles are
protected. As will be seen, applying the separability requirement
proved far more troublesome than merely espousing it in a
regulation.
2. Early Applications of Separability and Adoption of the
Separability Test in the 1976 Act
In 1966, a New York district court was presented with Ted
Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., Inc.,39 a case with facts very similar
to Mazer, but which arose in light of the regulation enacted by the
31. Id. at 211-13. Fine art consists of works having the intrinsic function or purpose to
be beautiful; objects of fine art are created for the primary or sole purpose of conveying the
object's appearance. Thus, the object's intrinsic function is to be beautiful. Useful articles, on
the contrary, have the primary function or concern to be "used" for some purpose beyond their
appearance or beauty. See supra note 3. Thus, a painting by Picasso has the intrinsic function
of conveying its appearance, whereas an automobile has the intrinsic function to transport
people, with its appearance being a secondary function.
32. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 212.
33. Id. at 218.
34. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1957).
35. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 54-55.
36. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1957) (amended 1960).
37. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960).
38. Id.
39. 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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Copyright Office as it stood in 1960.40 Ted Arnold involved a simu-
lation antique telephone which encased a pencil sharpener.41 De-
fendant had substantially copied the telephone pencil sharpener, but
maintained that plaintiff's copyright was invalid because it was not a
work of art but rather a work of utility."2 Perhaps for the first time,
a court discussed the concept of physical separability."' The court
remarked, "It is crucial at this point to make clear that the copy-
righted article is the simulation of an antique telephone, not the pen-
cil sharpener inside, and not the combination of the two."" The
court concluded that the copyright for the antique telephone, apart
from the mechanics of the pencil sharpener, was valid, since "[t]he
telephone casing could be separated physically from the pencil
sharpener." '45 The court embraced the reasoning from Mazer when
it concluded that, just as the statuette was unnecessary to support a
lamp, the antique telephone was unnecessary to encase a pencil
sharpener.
6
Between the Copyright Office's promulgation of section
202.10(c) and the passage of the 1976 Act, there were few other
developments in this area. One case of interest, which was one of the
final cases concerning works of applied art decided under the 1909
Act, is Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer."7 Although the case was decided in
1978, the articles in question were copyrighted prior to the effective
date of the 1976 Act, which occurred on January 1, 1978." Since
the 1976 Act had already passed, the court looked both to the 1976
Act and the House Report on the Act for guidance."9 Since consider-
ation of the 1976 Act played a significant role in the court's determi-
nation in Esquire, this comment's discussion will first turn to the
language of the 1976 Act and the legislative reports concerning
works of applied art; thereafter the decision in Esquire will be
reviewed.
The 1976 Act does not give exhaustive guidance in determining
whether a useful article or features of that article qualify for copy-
right protection. On the general issue of copyright protection of use-
40. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960).
41. 259 F. Supp. 733, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
42. Id. at 734.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Ted Arnold, 259 F. Supp. at 735 (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
48. Id. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (effective Jan. 1, 1978).
49. Esquire, 591 F.2d at 802-04.
19931
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
ful articles, the Act provides, "[c]opyright protection subsists in ...
pictorial, graphic and sculptural works."5 Further, the Act defines
"useful article" as "an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to con-
vey information. An item that is normally part of a useful article is
considered a 'useful article.' ""' In order to determine the scope of
copyright protection for "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works"
when such work consists of, or is part of a "useful article," one must
turn to both the Act's definition of these works and the House Re-
port.52 In defining "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works," the
Act states,
Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar
as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are
concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this sec-
tion, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work
only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of,
the utilitarian aspects of the article."
Although the Act defines the scope of protection for useful arti-
cles,54 this language, standing alone, can support varying interpreta-
tions. Thus, it is necessary to look to the House Report for addi-
tional explanation.
The House Report begins its discussion of pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works by noting that this category does not carry with
it an implied element of "artistic taste, aesthetic value, or intrinsic
quality."'55 This first statement opens the door for the inclusion and
discussion of works of "applied art." Much of what is noted by the
Report is the historical development of protection for works of ap-
plied art.56 Beginning with Mazer, the Report remarks that protec-
tion subsists despite factors such as mass production, commercial ex-
ploitation, and the potential availability of design patent protection."
50. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1991).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1991).
52. H.R. RE!P. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 54-55.
53. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1991).
54. Id.
55. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 54.
56. H.R. REiP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 55-56.
57. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 55. It was noted in Mazer and adopted in the
House Report that copyright protection is not affected by the fact that patent protection may
also be available for an article. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 55. Although both the
Court in Mazer and the House Report note the availability of patent protection, it is unlikely
[Vol. 33
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The language that follows this introduction, qualified by the Report
to "draw as clear a line as possible between copyrightable works of
applied art and uncopyrighted works of industrial design,""8 is the
language that has caused the crux of the confusion in this area of
law. The Committee Report explained:
The Committee has added language to the definition of "picto-
rial, graphic, and sculptural works" in an effort to make clearer
the distinction between works of applied art protectable under
the bill and industrial designs not subject to copyright protec-
tion. The declaration that "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works" include "works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their
form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are con-
cerned" is classic language: it is drawn from Copyright Office
regulations promulgated in the 1940's and expressly endorsed
by the Supreme Court in the Mazer case.
The second part of the amendment states that the "design
of a useful article ... shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing indepen-
dently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article."
...[Allthough the shape of an industrial product may be
aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the Committee's intention
is not to offer it copyright protection under the bill. Unless the
shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies' dress, food processor,
television set, or .any other industrial product contains some ele-
ment that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as sepa-
rable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design
would not be copyrighted under the bill. The test of separability
and independence from "the utilitarian aspects of the article"
does not depend upon the nature of the design-that is, even if
the appearance of an article is determined by esthetic (as op-
posed to functional) considerations, only elements, if any, which
can be identified separately from the useful article, as such, are
copyrightable.59
Prior to the House Report, which was the result of determina-
tions made by the Legislative Committee, the Senate had suggested a
different approach to copyright protection for useful articles.60 The
that any of the useful articles discussed in this comment could meet the stringent requirements
to receive patent protection. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS §§ 1.01-5.06 (1991). Thus,
copyright is the only protection that these items could realistically receive.
58. H.R. Ri,. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 55.
59. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 56.
60. S. Ru,'. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 161-62 (1975).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Senate proposed that copyright protection should be afforded to use-
ful articles subject only to the limitation that the design be original,
and was not "dictated solely by the utilitarian function of the article
that embodies it; or is composed of three-dimensional features of
shape and surface with respect to men's, women's, and children's
apparel."61 For the designs that could meet this lower standard, the
Senate suggested that protection begin when the useful article was
made public and would last for five years, with the opportunity for a
five year renewal.62
In proposing this new form of protection, the Senate aptly
noted,
The title is intended to offer the creator of ornamental designs
of useful articles a new form of protection directed toward the
special problems arising in the design field, and is intended to
avoid the defects of the existing copyright and design patent
statutes by providing simple, easily secured, and effective design
protection ...."
The House Committee did not accept this proposal but instead
chose to adopt and "clarify" the existing state of protection for useful
articles."' By examining subsequent case law, this comment will dis-
cuss and then analyze the various interpretations that this "clarify-
ing" language has been given by different courts and legal scholars.65
Returning to Esquire, in which the manufacturer of outdoor
lighting fixtures sought copyright protection for the "overall shape"
of the fixtures as a "work of art," the appellate court applied the
1909 Act and Copyright Office and also looked to the House Report
and the 1976 Act for guidance and support of its findings." The
plaintiff filed a complaint after the Register of Copyrights refused to
register the lighting fixtures.6" The Register's refusal was premised
on section 202.10(c), which denied registration of utilitarian articles
when the design elements for which registration is sought "are di-
rectly related to the useful functions of the article."6 According to
the Register, the fixtures or their overall shape did not contain "ele-
61. Id. at 162.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 161.
64. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 54-55.
65. See discussion infra parts II.B., IlIl.A-C.
66. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 802-04 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 908 (1979).
67. Id. at 799.
68. Id. at 798 (citing the Register's appellate brief).
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ments, either alone or in combination, which are capable of indepen-
dent existence . . .apart from the utilitarian aspect." '69
After discussing the rationale upon which registration was de-
nied, the court reviewed the 1909 Act and section 202.10(c). The
court concluded that the Register adopted a proper interpretation of
the regulation since only the features of a utilitarian article could be
protected, (not the article as a whole), and only to the extent that
these features "can be identified separately and are capable of ex-
isting independently as a work of art."7 For further support, the
court looked to the House Report and the new Act in relation to
works of utility.71 The court began by noting that although the new
Act was not applicable in this case, it was designed in part to codify
and clarify existing law.72 The court noted the legislative language
concerning separability, in that, unless the shape of a utilitarian arti-
cle "contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be
identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the
design would not be copyrighted under the bill."73 However, after
mentioning this language, the court brushed it aside by declaring,.
"any possible ambiguity raised by this isolated reference disappears
when the excerpt is considered in its entirety. The underscored
passages indicate unequivocally that the overall design or configura-
tion of a utilitarian object, even if it is determined by aesthetic as
well as functional considerations, is not eligible for copyright." '74
In addressing the separability issue, the court simply deter-
mined that only features or particular aspects of a utilitarian article
may meet this standard.7" Thus, the court distinguished Mazer, rea-
soning that the statuette was a separable feature of the overall design
of the lamp, but in this case, the shape of the fixture was not a
feature of the fixture but rather part of the fixture's overall design
which was not subject to protection.76 Therefore, under Esquire, sep-
arability turned on the issue of whether protection was sought for a
feature of the overall design, as opposed to the overall design itself,
and whether such a feature was separable from the utilitarian as-
pects of the article. 77 In other words, the Esquire court would only
69. Id.
70. Esquire, 591 F.2d at 800.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 803 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 55.)
74. Esquire, 591 F.2d at 803-04.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 805.
77. Id. at 803.
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grant protection for artistic "features" of an article which were
"physically" separable from the utilitarian aspects of the article.
B. Judicial Interpretation Since the Enactment of the 1976 Act
1. The Emergence of Conceptual Separability?
The first decision to consider the language of the House Report
on the new Act, specifically the language, "some element that, physi-
cally or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilita-
rian object," was Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc."8
Until this case, conceptual separability had no fundamental differ-
ence in meaning from physical separability, beyond the distinction
that one could conceive of physically separating a particular element
of the utilitarian object, such as the floral engraving on the back of a
chair. Judge Oakes in Kieselstein-Cord, however, extended the the-
ory of conceptual separability beyond the limited theory of physical
separation, and in doing so opened the door for dispute in this com-
plex and nebulous area of the law.79 The Second Circuit has been
presented with the most intriguing and troublesome cases regarding
works of applied art, and the decisions from this jurisdiction are of
great import.8" The Supreme Court has not been faced with the is-
sue of separability in works of applied art since its decision in Ma-
zer. Therefore, as of the moment, the Second Circuit remains the
authority on this issue."1
Judge Oakes began the majority opinion by aptly noting that
the issue presented before the court "is on a razor's edge of copyright
law."82 The utilitarian objects at issue were decorative, expensive
belt buckles, elaborately designed and made of precious metals, such
as gold and silver.8 The belt buckles did not contain elaborate orna-
mentation, such as jewels or floral designs, rather, the designs or
shapes of the buckles themselves were very "original" and distinc-
tive.8 4 The design of the buckles departed from the traditional geo-
78. 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
79. Id.
80. See infra note 138.
81. By "authority," it is not suggested that other circuits must follow the holdings of the
Second Circuit. But, since the Second Circuit has had the greatest number of opportunities and
the most difficult cases in this area, the opinions espoused by it should be influential upon
other courts.
82. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 990 (2d Cir. 1980).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 990-91.
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metric rectangle. 8 Instead, the designs contained a rectangular base,
but were curved with grooves, containing several surface levels. 6
Describing the belt buckles in more detail is not significant to the
analysis; what is important is that the buckles did not contain any
"ornaments" that could be physically separated from the buckle it-
self.8 7 Instead, the design of the buckle was the ornament for which
protection was sought.8 8 Of further interest was the fact that of the
two belt buckles at issue, one was copyrighted prior to the enactment
of the new Act, while the other was copyrighted after the 1976 Act
became effective.8 9
Since the defendant admitted to copying the plaintiff's belt
buckles, the issue before the court was whether the copyrights
granted for the belt buckles were valid.9" Defendant asserted that the
buckles were not copyrightable as works of utility, becauuse nothing
in the buckles could be identified separately from the utilitarian as-
pects.9 1 Although both the 1909 and the 1976 Acts needed to be ap-
plied to the two buckles separately, the court was left with the prob-
lem of determining "when a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature
can be identified separately from, and [is] capable of existing inde-
pendently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. This problem is
particularly difficult because . . . such separability may occur either
'physically or conceptually.'-"0
Rather than echoing the narrow view that conceptual separabil-
ity is equated to physical separability with the added component of
conceiving the physical separation, Judge Oakes asserted the doctrine
that copyright cannot subsist in the conceptual separation of an artis-
tic element "flies in the face of the legislative intent as expressed in
the House Report."9 " Unfortunately, in Kieselstein-Cord, Judge
85. Id. at 990.
86. Judge Oakes' description of the two buckles was as follows:
The Vaquero gives the appearance of two curved grooves running diagonally
across one corner of a modified rectangle and a third groove running across the
opposite corner. On the Winchester buckle two parallel grooves cut horizontally
across the center of a more tapered form, making a curving ridge which is com-
pleted by the tongue of the buckle. A smaller single curved groove flows diago-
nally across the corner above the tongue.
Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 990.
87. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993.
88. Id. at 991.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 991.
91. Id. at 991-92.
92. Id. at 993 (citation omitted).
93. Id.
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Oakes never espoused a test for determining the sufficiency of con-
ceptual separability. In fact, he barely analyzed his basis for con-
cluding that the buckles' design had reached the level of sufficient
conceptual separability. Instead, Judge Oakes based his analysis on
consumer reaction to the buckles.94 He stated, "We see in appellant's
belt buckles conceptually separable sculptural elements, as appar-
ently have the buckles' wearers who have used them as ornamenta-
tion for parts of the body other than the waist."" As a result, the
judge determined that the primary ornamental aspect of the buckles
was conceptually separable from their subsidiary utilitarian function.
A few years later, the Eleventh Circuit decided Norris Indus-
tries, Inc. v. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp.," a
case in which plaintiff sued for infringement of a copyright on wire
spoke wheel covers for automobiles.97 Although there was dispute
among the parties over which Act applied, the court determined that,
even though the 1909 Act applied in this controversy, the same result
would follow under either Act." The court reasoned that the 1976
Act was simply a clarification of already existing principles because
the House Report indicated that Congress was endorsing the Copy-
right Office's regulations in regard to the registrability of utilitarian
articles. 9 Therefore, the court looked to the 1976 Act and the House
Report as "useful aids" in determining the issue of whether the
wheel covers were copyrightable under the 1909 Act.1 0
After first determining that the wheel covers fell under the
94. Id.
95. Id. at 993. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Weinstein stressed that, although the
buckles were very attractive, they were nothing more than useful articles, because the artistic
aspects were inseparable from the utilitarian function of holding up trousers. He was willing
to accept that the narrow view of separability would in fact deny protection to otherwise artis-
tic objects, if these objects were not useful articles. He stated:
The result does deny protection to designers who use modern three-dimensional
abstract works artfully incorporated into a functional object as an inseparable
aspect of the article while granting it to those who attach their independent
representational art, or even their trite gimmickry, to a useful article for pur-
poses of enhancement. Moreover, this result enables the commercial pirates of
the marketplace to appropriate for their own profit, without any cost to them-
selves, the works of talented designers who enrich our lives with their intuition
and skill. The crass are rewarded, the artist who creates beauty is not .... It is
the originator's success in completely integrating the artistic. designs and the
functional aspects of the buckles that preclude copyright.
Id. at 994. (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
96. 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 920.
99. Id. at 921.
100. Id.
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"useful article" category, the court asked whether any element or
elements could be physically or conceptually separable from the util-
itarian article.1"' After eliminating the aspects of the wheel cover
that were strictly parts, the court had to determine if the arrange-
ment of the spokes could be identified separately from the utilitarian
article.10 2 In holding that the spokes did not meet this test, the court
cited the Copyright Register's explanation that "the placement of the
spokes is an inseparable component of the wheel cover. The spokes
are attached to the rim and to the hub, and once the spokes are
removed from their position the pattern ceases to exist."
10 3
In response to this reasoning, the plaintiff argued that the pat-
tern of the spokes was conceptually separable."0 4 The court disagreed
and held that the design of the spokes and the wheel covers them-
selves did not meet the test of conceptual separability because, the
spokes were "not superfluous ornamental designs, but functional
components of utilitarian articles."10 5 In an attempt to distinguish
Kieselstein-Cord, the court remarked that the form of jewelry has
traditionally been afforded copyright protection, whereas the shape
of a useful article has traditionally not been afforded copyright pro-
tection."° Nonetheless, the court failed to note that in Kieselstein-
Cord, the belt buckles were considered "useful articles.
1 0 7
At the same time that the Eleventh Circuit decided the Norris
case, the Ninth Circuit decided Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp 08
Fabrica was a copyright action for infringement of a carpet display
folder.1 9 The folder was described as a distinctive, high-quality dis-
play folder, covered by simulated white suede, with stitching along
the borders and brass tips on the corners, featuring a unique fold-out
book format.11 The defendant admitted that it copied the folder but
denied infringement on the basis that the folders were works of util-
ity with inseparable features."' The court agreed with the defendant
but provided little discussion on the issue of separability." 2 The
101. Id. at 922-23.
102. Id. at 923.
103. Id.
104, Id.
105. Id. at 924.
106. Id.
107. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993-94 (2d Cir.
1980).
108. 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 892.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 893-94.
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court simply noted that the folders lacked any artistic feature which
was identifiable as separate from the utilitarian aspects, because the
folder's only purpose was to market the carpeting."' 3 The court did
not extrapolate on this point, and one wonders how much emphasis
the court placed on the purpose or intent behind the creation of the
useful article, or features of that article.
Shortly thereafter, the Sixth Circuit was presented with a dis-
pute over the copyrights for toy airplanes in Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy
L Corp."" The significance of this case is founded upon the court's
interpretation of new language in the 1976 Act in regard to useful
articles, and the court's determination that toys which portray useful
articles are not themselves useful articles under the statutory
definition." 5
At issue were model airplanes that were allegedly copied by pe-
titioner."6 The district court concluded that the toys were useful ar-
ticles since a "toy airplane is useful and possesses utilitarian and
functional characteristics in that it permits a child to dream and to
let his or her imagination soar.""'  The court of appeals flatly re-
jected this broad interpretation of the term "useful article.""' 8 In-
stead, the appellate court maintained that in spite of the fact that the
definition of "useful article" had been expanded by the 1976 Act, the
Act did not sweep all articles which have a "use" into the category of
"useful articles.""' 9 Rather, for an article to fall within the category
of "useful articles," it must have "an intrinsic utilitarian function
that is not merely to portray the appearance of that article."' 2° Toy
airplanes are not "useful articles" because the toys are merely a
model or portrayal of the "useful article. '13 The court remarked, "a
toy airplane is to be played with and enjoyed . . . . [O]ther than the
portrayal of a real airplane, a toy airplane, like a painting, has no
intrinsic utilitarian function.' 22 Therefore, since the toys were not
"useful articles," it was irrelevant to discuss separability.' 23 Only
113. Id. at 894.
114. 703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983).
115. Id. at 973.
116. Id. at 970.
117. Id. at 973 (quoting district court, Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 522 F. Supp.
622, 625 (E.D. Mich. 1981)).
118. Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 1983).
119. Id. at 973-74.
120. Id. at 973 n.4 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
121. Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 974.
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"useful articles" which qualify as "sculptural works" are limited by
the separability test. 24 As to the toys before the court, copyright pro-
tection would subsist in the expression of the idea, provided that the
other requirements for copyrightability are met.' "5 The Gay Toys de-
cision is significant in that toys were held not to have an "intrinsic
utilitarian function," either in the utilitarian object the toy repre-
sented nor in the fact that toys function as play-things for chil-
dren. 2' Thus, according to this court, whatever utilitarian function
the toys may have, this function is not its "intrinsic" function." 7 The
concept of a useful article, then, is not so broad as to include any
article which may have a significant utilitarian function, so long as
such function is not considered "intrinsic."
Approximately one year later, the ball was back in the Ninth
Circuit's court. In Poe v. Missing Persons,'28 the plaintiff had cre-
ated what he titled "artwork in the medium of soft sculpture,"
whereby the soft sculpture represented a woman's swimsuit."' The
swimsuit was based on a two-piece swimsuit made primarily of clear
plastic. 3 The female anatomical parts which are traditionally cov-
ered by two-piece swimsuits were covered in this swimsuit by filling
the plastic pockets with crushed colored rock in the appropriate ar-
eas.' 3 ' Infringement was alleged to have occurred through the unau-
thorized use of a model wearing the sculpture, which was then dis-
played on the cover of a Missing Persons' musical album.' 32
Since the plaintiff was appealing the grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant, the issue presented for the court of
appeals was whether or not a genuine issue of material fact ex-
isted.133 In reviewing the result below, the court had to decide
whether the article in question fell within the category of "useful
articles" by virtue of the "fact" that it was a swimsuit, or whether it
was a "sculptural work." As a sculptural work, it would not be lim-
124. Id.
125. The other requirements under the Act are originality and fixation, as discussed
supra, note 12.
126. Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973.
127. Id.
128. 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984).
129. Id. at 1239-41.
130. Id. at 1241.
131. Id.
132. Missing Persons is a musical group, which gained popularity in the late 1970's and
early 1980's. Poe, 745 F.2d at 1240-41.
133. Id. at 1241 (quoting M/V American Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr., 708
F.2d 1483, 1487 (9th Cir. 1983)).
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ited by the separability requirement for "useful articles."""4 Since
determination of whether the article was a swimsuit (and thus a
"useful article") raised a question of fact, as opposed to a question of
law, summary judgment was held inappropriate. '"
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Gay Toys on the grounds that
the articles in that case were "toys" as a matter of fact, so that the
determination that "toys" are not "useful articles" was a question of
law.'" 6 Whereas, in Poe, the categorization of the article raised a
factual question; it was not a question of law.13 7 The court then
identified four types of relevant evidence which could aid the trier of
fact in determining whether the article is in fact a "useful article": 1)
expert evidence regarding the usefulness of the article; 2) evidence of
plaintiff's intent in designing the article, as it weighs on the issue of
utilitarian function; 3) testimony of custom within the art and cloth-
ing trade in regard to the article in question; and 4) the marketabil-
ity of the article as a swimsuit.' 38
2. Current State of Conceptual Separability
This comment examines two of the leading cases in which the
contemporary test for separability, either physical or conceptual, has
been developed.' 39 Since these cases represent the state of the law as
it now stands, much of this comment's analysis focuses on the vari-
ous tests and factors which have been presented by both the majority
and dissenting opinions in these cases.
In 1985, the Second Circuit decided Carol Barnhart Inc. v.
Economy Cover Corp.,"0O a case that exposed the shortcomings of the
statutory language and prior case law on the issue of separability."'
Barnhart involved four styrene mannequins for which the plaintiff
held copyrights."" The mannequins were very different from con-
134. 745 F.2d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1984).
135. Id. at 1242-43. Poe was heard before a jury.
136. 745 F.2d at 1242.
137. Id. at 1243.
138. Id. (citing, Trans-World Mfg. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 95, 99 (D.
Del. 1982); Sarony Products v. Guerlain, Inc., 513 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1975); Norris Indus. v.
Int'l Tel., 696 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1983); Cf May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Associ-
ates, 618 F.2d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1980); M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIc.HIr § 2.08 (B)
at 2-96.2-2.96.3 (1984)).
139. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985);
Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
140. Barnhart, 773 F.2d 411.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 412-13.
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ventional mannequins because they were not representations of the
entire body.143 The life-size mannequins developed by the plaintiff
were created to display shirts, jackets and sweaters, and therefore
only represented the front of the human torso, but contained no neck,
arms, or back. 44 Of the four mannequins, two represented male and
two represented female torsos.1 45 For both genders, there was one
nude and one clothed torso, with the clothed torsos having pre-
sculpted dress shirts in order to display such clothing as sweaters and
jackets, without the store having to place a dress shirt on the manne-
quin.146 The nude torsos were anatomically accurate as to the frontal
aspects, whereas the backs were hollowed-out to hold excess fabric
when the garment was fitted onto the form.' 47 Defendant admitted
copying the mannequins developed by plaintiff, thereby prompting
an infringement action."
Although it is not of great importance to imagine or perceive
the mannequins' actual appearance, what is important is to under-
stand that the mannequins were distinctively different from the
traditional, full-figured mannequins of the time. As a result of their
uniqueness, the mannequins pushed the language of the 1976 Act to
its limits, and forced the court to determine what is perhaps the most
difficult test under the separability requirement. What made the
copyrightability of the mannequins such a difficult issue was that it
was the design itself of the mannequins for which copyright protec-
tion was sought. 49 Unlike a pencil sharpener encased in an antique
telephone, no part or element of the mannequins could be physically
separated (either literally or figuratively). 5 0 Instead, if protection
were to be afforded for the mannequins, such protection would have
to be founded wholly upon conceptual separability of some artistic
element which was, however, inextricably intertwined with the phys-
ical requirements of utility.1 5'
Since the mannequins were "useful articles" under the statute,
the issue presented in Barnhart was whether the mannequins "pos-
sess[ed] artistic or aesthetic features that were physically or concep-
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 412-13.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 413, 418.
150. See id. at 418-19.
151. Id.
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tually separable from their utilitarian dimension.""2 In writing the
majority opinion, Judge Mansfield ruled that the mannequins were
not proper subject matter for copyright protection because there was
no aesthetic or artistic features which were separable from the utili-
tarian aspects of the article, for such features "cannot be conceptual-
ized as existing independently of their utilitarian function."16
After invalidating the copyrights on the mannequins, Judge
Mansfield attempted to distinguish Kieselstein-Cord from Barn-
hart.54 He stressed that the crucial difference between the belt
buckles and the mannequins was the fact that the belt buckles con-
tained "ornamentation" in their design.' Judge Mansfield reasoned
that since there was no visual ornamentation present in the manne-
quins, then there was no artistic or aesthetic aspect which could be
conceptually separate from and independent of the utilitarian aspects
of the mannequins.' 56 He commented:
What distinguishes those buckles from the Barnhart forms is
that the ornamented surfaces of the buckles were not in any
respect required by their utilitarian functions; the artistic and
aesthetic features could thus be conceived of as having been
added to, or superimposed upon, an otherwise utilitarian article.
The unique artistic design was wholly unnecessary to the per-
formance of the utilitarian function.157
In juxtaposing the mannequins with the belt buckles, Judge
Mansfield reasoned that the shape of the figure was "inextricably
intertwined with the utilitarian feature . . . ."' He concluded there-
fore, that in order for a mannequin to function, the functional re-
quirements dictate that the form or overall design must be that of the
human figure, these designs or artistic features could not be concep-
tually (or physically) separated from their utilitarian function. 59 On
the other hand, a belt buckle could function as such without
ornamentation.160
In dissent, Judge Newman denounced the holding and rationale
of the majority and proposed a new test for determining conceptual
152. Id. at 414.
153. Id. at 418.
154. Id. at 418-19. For a discussion of Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc.,
63,2 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980), see supra footnotes 78-95 and accompanying text.
155. Id.
156. Id. 418-19.
157. Id. at 419 (citation omitted).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 419.
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separability.1"' In beginning his analysis Judge Newman stated that
whatever conceptual separability means, it must mean something dif-
ferent than physical separability, and thus it becomes "obvious that a
design feature can be 'conceptually separable' from the utilitarian
aspect of a useful article even if it cannot be separated physically."' 62
Judge Newman then surveyed the previously proposed tests before
offering his standard for conceptual separability.16
Judge Newman started with Judge Oakes' opinion in Kiesel-
stein-Cord, discounting this test due to its inability to give guidance
to the trier of fact.164 He also faulted Judge Oakes' test for placing
emphasis on whether the "utilitarian" or the "artistic" aspect was
"primary" to the article.'6 5 Judge Newman implied that under this
test the belt buckles would not be afforded protection because the
buckles were primarily used to fasten belts. 6
Judge Newman next referred to Professor Nimmer's approach,
which suggested that conceptual separability existed when "there is
any substantial likelihood that even if the article had no utilitarian
use it would still be marketable to some significant segment of the
community simply because of its aesthetic qualities."' 6 7 Judge New-
man swiftly pointed out that this approach would provide protection
only for popular art, and many forms which are artistic and popu-
larly pleasing would fail to meet this standard because those who are
willing to purchase these articles may not be a "significant segment
of the community."' 66
Lastly, he challenged the view that protection should be af-
forded whenever the "form has sufficient aesthetic appeal to be ap-
preciated for its artistic qualities."' 9 This approach was unaccept-
able to Judge Newman because it had been rejected by Congress and
flew in the face of the House Report's mandate that the copyright-
able features of a work of applied art must be physically or concep-
tually separable from the utilitarian aspects of the article.1
7 0
After criticizing these earlier tests for determining conceptual
161. Id. at 419-26 (Newman, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 421 (footnote omitted).
163. Id. at 421-22.
164. Id. at 421.
165. Id. at 421 (Newman, J., dissenting).
166. Id.
167. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting NIMMER, supra note 8, § 2.08[B], at 2-100 (foot-
note omitted)).
168. Id. at 421-22 (Newman, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 422.
170. Id.
19931
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
separability, Judge Newman proposed what has been described as a
"displacement test." '71 Judge Newman asserted that the artistic fea-
tures of a useful article are separable when the article stimulates in
the ordinary observer a "concept" which is independent from the
article's utilitarian "concept." 1 ' Further, this "concept" which is
perceived independently from the utilitarian function is to be con-
ceived at a different moment than the concept of the article's util-
ity. 7 As Judge Newman explained:
[T]he article must stimulate in the mind of the beholder a con-
cept that is separate from the concept evoked by its utilitarian
function. The test turns on what may reasonably be understood
to be occurring in the mind of the beholder or, as some might
say, in the'"mind's eye" of the beholder. This formulation re-
quires consideration of who the beholder is and when a concept
may be considered "separate."
I think the relevant beholder must be that most useful legal
personage - the ordinary, reasonable observer ....
I think the requisite "separateness" exists whenever the de-
sign creates in the mind of the ordinary observer two different
concepts that are not inevitably entertained simultaneously . . .
whether the concept of the utilitarian function can be displaced
in the mind by some other concept.174
Judge Mansfield responded to Judge Newman's "displacement"
test via a footnote in the majority opinion.' 5 He criticized the novel
approach by Judge Newman as being "so ethereal as to amount to a
'non-test' that would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to ad-
minister or apply. ' 6 This criticism was founded on the premise
that the "displacement" test would depend on how the article was
displayed, and almost any article could be displayed in such a fash-
ion that it would meet the requisite standard.177 Further, Judge
Mansfield noted that under Judge Newman's standard, copyright
protection could be founded upon "temporary flight of fancy that
could attach to any utilitarian object . . . depending on how it is
displayed.' '1 78
171. Perlmutter, supra note 21, at 375-77.
172. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422-23 (2d. Circ.
1985) (Newman, J., dissenting).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 422.
175. Id. at 419 n.5.
176. Id. at 419 n.5 (Newman, J., dissenting).
177. Id.
178. Id.
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As a result of the majority opinion in Barnhart, it remained
uncertain whether purely "conceptual" separability was a strong
enough doctrine to provide an independent foundation for copyright
in the artistic elements of a useful article. Further, Judge Mans-
field's statement distinguishing the mannequins from the belt buck-
les, questioned if conceptual separability could ever be found solely
in the design of a useful article. 17 9
Judge Mansfield's majority opinion did not, however, settle the
issue of conceptual separability. A few years after Barnhart, the
Second Circuit was once again confronted with the issue of concep-
tual separability in Brandir International Inc. v. Cascade Pacific
Lumber Co. 8' This case afforded Judge Oakes another opportunity
to analyze this troublesome theory and shed more light on his opin-
ion in Kieselstein-Cord.
The article in dispute in Brandir was the "RIBBON Rack"
bicycle rack, made of bent tubing, which was adapted from an origi-
nal wire sculpture. 8" The defendant admitted to copying the bicycle
rack, but denied infringement, thereby raising the issue of conceptual
separability once again.'
8 1
Judge Oakes' opinion for the court claimied that, since Kiesel-
stein-Cord was distinguished in Barnhart, the former case was still
good law.' 83 Rather than e.cpand on his holding or rationale in
Kieselstein-Cord, Judge Oakes decided to adopt the reasoning from
Professor Denicola's article on applied art.' 84 Denicola's test stressed
the relationship between the final work and the process in which
that design came to fruition.' 86 Thus, if an article's process is dic-
tated solely by utilitarian concerns, which, as most industrial designs
are, nothing in the article deserves copyright protection.' 8 On the
other hand, those aspects of the design "whose origins lie outside the
design process, despite the utilitarian environment in which they ap-
pear," should be afforded copyright protection. 187 Under Denicola's
view, the determination of copyright "ultimately should depend on
the extent to which the work reflects artistic expression uninhibited
179. Id. at 418-19. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see infra notes 229-40
and accompanying text.
180. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1144.
184. Id., Denicola, supra note 9.
185. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145; Denicola, supra note 9, at 741.
186. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145; Denicola, supra note 9, at 741.
187. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145; Denicola, supra note 9, at 741 (citation omitted).
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by functional considerations."'0' Judge Oakes embraced Denicola's
analysis and then rephrased the test for conceptual separability as
follows: "[I]f design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and func-
tional considerations, the artistic aspects of a work cannot be said to
be conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements. Conversely,
where design elements can be identified as reflecting the designer's
artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influences,
conceptual separability exists."'8 9
Through the Denicola test, Judge Oakes sought to harmonize
the apparent conflict between Barnhart and Kieselstein-Cord.9 ° He
rationalized that, under the Denicola test, the mannequins which
were denied copyright protection by the court would fail because the
artistic features found in the anatomical design and the sculpted
clothing "showed clearly the influence of the functional concerns." '191
In applying this test to the bicycle racks, Judge Oakes denied
copyright protection by concluding that, although the form of the
rack was artistic, this artistic form was "influenced in significant
measure by utilitarian concerns . . . .""' Therefore, under the Den-
icola test, when the artistic features follow the utilitarian require-
ments, conceptual separability does not exist, and the artistic features
are not protected by copyright. 9
After applying the Denicola standard, Judge Oakes commented
that if the sculpture had not been adapted to fulfill the needs of the
utilitarian article (namely a bicycle rack), then the design would be
protected.' 94 That is, if the original artist had by chance previously
created a sculpture without utilitarian considerations, and subse-
quently such a sculpture could function as a bicycle rack without
utilitarian adaptations, then such a design would pass the Denicola
test, despite its utilitarian end.'
What differentiates Judge Oakes' conceptual separability test
from others is that his test requires an inquiry into the "artist's"
intent when designing the object. 96 In determining whether the de-
sign of the article was compelled by utilitarian or purely aesthetic
needs, Judge Oakes remarked that the parties would be "required to
188. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145; Denicola, supra note 9, at 741 (citation omitted).
189. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1147.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1148.
195. Id. at 1147.
196. Id. at 1147-48.
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present evidence relating to the design process and the nature of the
work . ,,.*."' Under this test, if any features could be identified as
existing independently of utilitarian influences, such features would
be considered the result of artistic judgment or intention and would
receive protection.198 However, just as Barnhart may not have over-
ruled Kieselstein-Cord, it is questionable as to whether the rationale
of Brandir will set precedent, and/or replace the reasoning of
Barnhart.199
III. ANALYSIS
Distinguishing between what does and does not qualify as art is
inevitably a subjective and arbitrary procedure, but also a truly im-
portant one. The need for distinguishing between an object's func-
tional and aesthetic qualities is founded upon Congress' legitimate
fear that granting copyright protection to useful articles would deter
progress.2"' Since copyright protection provides the copyright owner
with exclusive rights,"0 1 protecting the functional aspects of a useful
article would fundamentally give the copyright owner a monopoly
over that article, stifling progress of the arts and sciences by depriv-
ing others of the economic incentive to create.20 2 Such a result would
be contrary to the purpose of affording copyright protection in the
first place. As provided in the Constitution, "The Congress shall
have the Power ...To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... "203
Therefore, the ultimate purpose of copyright is to promote science
and art and protection of the author's rights is seen as a necessary
197. Id. at 1145.
198. Id. at 1145-48.
199. Since Judge Mansfield distinguished Barnhart from Kieselstein-Cord on the basis
that one case involved mannequins and the other involved belt buckles, Carol Barnhart, Inc. v.
Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418-19 (2d Cir. 1985), it seems that any case could be
distinguished from prior cases on the basis that different objects are in question. Also, the mere
fact that Judge Oakes chose to create his own test, as opposed to following the majority's
rationale in Barnhart, leaves the door open for the next majority opinion to discard his test.
200. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 559; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 161-62 (1975). See also 37
C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960); Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d
Cir. 1985).
201. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1991).
202. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); See NIMMER, supra note 8, § 1.03[A].
203. U.S. CoNs'r. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "Writing" under this part of the Constitution has
been defined very liberally to encompass all forms of expression. See Burrows-Giles Litho-
graphing Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); NIMMER, supra note 8, § 1.06.
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means for such promotion.20 4 By providing the author with exclusive
rights for a limited term, 05 authors will be encouraged to create,
because they will be assured the fruits of their labor.200 Without as-
surance of protection, many authors would be discouraged from cre-
ative activity, and progress would lag.10 7
There is a delicate balance between providing enough protection
to encourage creation and providing too much protection which, al-
though protecting the original author, discourages or prohibits others
in a similar field from pursuing their own efforts. 08 The law con-
cerning the protection of useful articles has shown just how difficult
this balancing can become, especially when commercial products are
involved and much of the economy depends on competition within
commercial fields. 20 9
As is clear from the House Report, the useful article itself is not
intended to be protected. 10 Instead, protection may be granted only
for the aesthetic elements which are either physically or conceptually
separable from the utilitarian aspects of the article.2 1 ' As straightfor-
ward as this distinction may seem, courts have found it very difficult
to apply a consistent standard in separating the artistic from the
functional.21 2 Ideally, if founded on a fixed standard, even if arbi-
trarily fixed, drawing the line between the aesthetic and the func-
tional elements of an object vould eliminate the vastly differing
opinions concerning what may be and what should not be considered
"art." But, as will be suggested below, judges have either followed
highly abstracted tests, or have on their own initiative chosen to
draw their own subjective line between art and utility.218 Chronolog-
ically surveying the contemporary opinions involving the application
of conceptual separability to useful articles, it will be shown that
204. 347 U.S. at 219; NIMMER, supra note 8, § 1.03[A].
205. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1991).
206. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219; NIMMER, supra note 8, § 1.031A].
207. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219; NIMMER, see supra note 8, § 1.031A].
208. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219; NIMMER, supra note 8, § 1.031A]. "Author" in this con-
text refers to any person who is the creator of an original, fixed expression, in any tangible
medium, such as print, motion picture, sculpture, or music. See generally id. §§ 1.06, 1.08[B],
[F]; Burrows-Giles Lithographing Co. v. Sarony, III U.S. 53 (1884), the Court interpreted
"author" under art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution, to mean "[hie to whom anything owes its
origin." Id. at 58.
209. See generally NIMMER, supra note 8, § 2.08.
210. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 54-55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5659.
211. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 54-55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5659.
212. See supra notes 78-199 and accompanying text.
213. See infra notes 214-55 and accompanying text.
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these tests fail either in their reasoning or application. Once these
tests have been criticized, either a new standard or a more objective
test can be created, one which sufficiently protects artists and
removes from the judiciary the impossible and inherently non-judi-
cial task of judging what qualifies as "art."
A. Kieselstein-Cord: Recognition of Separability in the Design of
the Object
As noted earlier, the importance of the Kieselstein-Cord case is
not found in its rationale, but rather in both the subject matter of the
dispute and the holding that the ornamental features were concep-
tually separable from the utilitarian requirements of the belt
buckle.214 In light of the Barnhart decision,21 it was unfortunate
that Judge Oakes chose to label the separable protected features as
"ornamental. 2" Labeling the features as ornamental suggests that
these features were attached or added onto the belt buckles."' From
the language of the opinion it is difficult to determine whether Judge
Oakes was using the term "ornamental" to mean an embellishment
upon the article, or simply an addition within the article which adds
beauty to the function.218 In his opinion, it appears that by "orna-
mental," Judge Oakes was simply trying to distinguish between "ar-
tistic" features and "utilitarian" features, thereby suggesting that he
meant any ornamental aspect which adds beauty to the mere func-
tional elements of the object. 9 Although precisely defining this term
is very important to this issue of law, his decision did not turn on
whatever meaning Judge Oakes meant to give to "ornamental. 220
As also noted earlier, Judge Oakes provided very little explana-
tion as to the court's determination that the buckles' design met the
criteria for conceptual separability.221 He concluded that conceptual
214. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980).
215. 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985). See infra notes 226-36 and accompanying text.
216. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993.
217. See Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 418. See also infra notes 226-36 and accompanying
text.
218. This distinction is very important, for an ornament which embellishes an object is a
physical addition which is not completely integrated into the article's functional elements. On
the other hand, an ornament which adds beauty to the article may do so intrinsically through
the article's design. Thus, an embellished ornament may be physically separated without af-
fecting the article's function, whereas a design which is ornamental may only be conceptually
separated.
219. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993.
220. Id.
221. See supra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
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separability existed, and then explained that body ornamentation has
been an art form for centuries and that many of the owners of the
buckles wore them solely for appearance or jewelry, not as functional
belt buckles. 22 2 The question thereby raised, but not explored, is
should the ultimate use the consumer chooses for the article be deter-
minative or even relevant in deciding whether there are aesthetic fea-
tures which are conceptually separable from the utilitarian aspects?
Judge Oakes' line of inquiry seems to be misplaced. An inquiry into
consumer use is relevant when the court is determining whether or
not an object should be considered a useful article, but consumer use
should carry much less weight when determining conceptual separa-
bility. Either the design of the buckle is separable from the utilita-
rian aspects of the buckle when it was first manufactured, or separa-
bility is lacking. Although the use a consumer puts to an object may
highlight its artistic features, this subsequent use is neither what
gives the object artistic qualities nor what gives it artistic worth.
What actually occurs after the product has left the manufacturer
does not bear on whether an article is artistic or contains any ele-
ment which is conceptually separable. If the buckles had not been so
popular nor worn as anything but a belt buckle, would the court fail
to find conceptual separability? If so, the result would be a determi-
nation based on judicial speculation about consumer taste and court
decisions defining what is artistic. This test could only lead to ineq-
uitable results in the courts.22 If apart from this line of reasoning,
the court would still have found the design of the buckles separable,
then consumer use is properly considered a post hoc rationalization.
Thus, the decision in Kieselstein-Cord leaves us with little more
than the tautology that conceptual separability existed in the belt
buckles, because it existed in the belt buckles. 224 The most persuasive
verdict on the insufficiency of the Kieselstein-Cord rationale comes
from Judge Oakes himself. It was Judge Oakes who developed the
extensive and different test for conceptual separability in Brandir.2
222. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F. 2d at 993-94.
223. Judge Mansfield asserted that the problem with a test based on the ordinary per-
son's observation was that such an observation may attach to a temporary flight of fancy,
resulting in protection for every useful article. Carol Barnhart v. Economy Cover Corp., 773
F.2d 411, 419 n.5 (2d Cir. 1985). Judge Newman also pointed out that a test based on con-
sumer use fails to account for the object's actual and intended use. Id. at 421 (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
224. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993. This test has been described as, "We know it
when we see it." Perlmutter, supra note 21, at 359.
225. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987); see
supra notes 184-95 and accompanying text.
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B. Barnhart: Narrowing the Scope of "Conceptual."
The mannequins involved in the Barnhart case could be pro-
tected only if the overall design could be protected, and the court was
forced to determine whether any aspect of the mannequins could be
conceptually separated from the utilitarian requirements of the arti-
cles.226 A reading of Judge Mansfield's majority opinion suggests
that he was following the reasoning from Kieselstein-Cord,227 be-
cause he gives little in the way of defining conceptual separability,
but determines that it cannot be found in the figures. "28
As noted in the dissent, whatever is meant by "conceptual," it
must have a different meaning than "physical." '229 As simple as that
statement may appear, Judge Mansfield's opinion either fails to rec-
ognize this distinction or intends to restrict conceptual separability to
the imagination of physical separation.2 " Judge Mansfield fails to
find conceptual separability in Barnhart because "the life-size con-
figuration of the breasts and the width of the shoulders, are inextri-
cably intertwined with the utilitarian feature, the display of
clothes."2 3 ' Thus, for Judge Mansfield, nothing could actually or
conceptually be removed from the mannequins which was not also a
functional or utilitarian part of the mannequin.232 But is Judge
Mansfield right in that conceptual separability is merely conceiving
of physical separation? If so, then why did the language of the
House Report state, "[ulnless the shape ...contains some element
that, physically or conceptually, can be identified separably from the
utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be copy-
righted."2 ' Thus, conceptual must mean something other than phys-
ical, contrary to Judge Mansfield's analysis.
Judge Mansfield also failed to consider whether conceptual sep-
arability might lie in the design of the mannequins; that is, not in
any part of the object taken separately, but in the design of the object
itself as an artistically separate element from the utilitarian require-
ments of the object. Few would question that in order for a manne-
quin to function, there must be a life-like representation of the
226. Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 417.
227. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993.
228. Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 418-19.
229. See id. at 420; see supra note 162 and accompanying text.
230. See Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 418-19.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 419.
233. H.R. REP. No. 1476 supra note 3, at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 5659
(emphasis added).
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human chest and width of shoulders, but how the designer chooses to
actually represent or design these necessities may. reach the level of
creativity and originality sufficient to achieve an aesthetic quality.
Although the Barnhart forms required that there be an accurate rep-
resentation of the human chest and shoulders, because the forms
were to function as mannequins, there was no requirement that the
mannequins be designed lacking arms, having hollowed-out backs,
made of styrene, or even have the particular shape chosen for the
breasts or shoulders. In fact, the mannequins could have been
designed in a form which was more muscular, heavy, or twisted.
When the physical manifestation of an object is not completely dic-
tated by its function, design can reach the level of aesthetic beyond
the physical addition of an unnecessary part which can be easily
identified as "artistic."
Judge Mansfield's failure to recognize conceptual separability
independent of physical separation is further illustrated in his at-
tempt to distinguish the mannequins from the Kieselstein-Cord belt
buckles. 34 He declared that what separates the mannequins from
the belt buckles was that in the belt buckles, "the artistic and aes-
thetic features could thus be conceived of as having been added to, or
superimposed upon, an otherwise utilitarian article. ' '235 If separation
is dependent upon whether or not one could conceive of the artistic
features as added to or superimposed upon the object, then the mere
design of the object could never meet this test, because only orna-
ments of embellishment may be added to or superimposed upon the
design. This line of reasoning employed by Judge Mansfield effec-
tively eliminates conceptual separability, in that separate inquiries
into either physically adding or conceptually imagining such a physi-
cal addition are species of the same genus, namely physical separa-
tion. To give effect to the legislative intent, conceptual separability
should, however, rest on an independent determination, regardless of
whether any part can actually be or imagined to be physically de-
tached, and recognized as artistic.23
Returning to the original premise of this comment, would
David be afforded copyright protection under the Barnhart test? If
David were created life-sized as a mannequin for clothing displays,
Judge Mansfield would have to answer no. According to the logic of
the Barnhart opinion, since nothing of David could be "conceived of
234. Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419.
235. Id.
236. Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 420 (Newman, J., dissenting); H.R. REP. No. 1476 supra
note 3, at 55.
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as been added to, or superimposed upon, an otherwise utilitarian ar-
ticle," there would not be any form of copyright protection for
David.237 That is, since David does not contain any ornamental em-
bellishment, nothing could be physically separated or imagined to be
physically separated as solely artistic. The result of such a narrow
view of separation, and what reeks of either misplaced artistic elitism
or poor reasoning, is in fact discouragement of progress in the arts,
the fundamental object of copyright law. The post-modern art age
has expanded beyond the traditional art forms and often manifests
and represents itself in everyday items.238 If copyright law fails to
recognize art forms which have not yet become either mainstream or
historically recognized, then it is failing in its ultimate purpose of
promotion of progress, for progress does not evolve through recogni-
tion of the historical, but through recognition of what is current.
The short-sightedness of the majority's opinion was recognized
by Judge Newman.2"9 Although Judge Newman made some impor-
tant points in his dissent, the test he suggested, as Judge Mansfield
aptly remarked, is too subjective and ephemeral to provide either
much guidance to, or uniformity in, subsequent decisions. 40 Judge
Newman's "displacement" test has an attractive intellectual flavor to
it, but is too abstracted from ordinary observation. The assertion that
conceptual separability exists when the object stimulates "in the
mind of the beholder a concept that is separate from the concept
evoked by its utilitarian function . . . [and these] are not inevitably
entertained simultaneously," 41 rests on unstated and untested as-
sumptions about how the reasonable observer thinks. It is doubtful
whether any observer would look at a useful article and take note of
a concept that is completely free from the object's intended and ac-
tual use. It is difficult to imagine that the ordinary observer viewing
a mannequin at a clothing store would be able to conceive of the
mannequin as aesthetically pleasing without at the same time think-
ing oi' the display function served by the mannequin. The ordinary
observer is more likely to consider the object for its use, and at the
237. Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419.
238. A simple example would be a sculpture of a chair, which functions as a chair, but
is shaped like an "s." That is, its legs are curved in one direction, and its back is curved in the
opposite direction, creating somewhat of a visual illusion, while being able to function as a
chair. Therefore, although the design of the chair is completely functional, it is that design
alone which encompasses aesthetic qualities.
239. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419-20 (2d Cir.
1985) (Newman, J., dissenting).
240. Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419 n.5.
241. Id. at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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same time consider its aesthetic appeal. Even if such a phenomenon
could occur, application of this standard could never find its way to
the neighborhood of objectivity. A judge's opinion of whether a rea-
sonable observer could independently conceive of a concept other
than the article's utilitarian concept leads directly into an inquiry of
artistic value. Given the particular object in question, a judge would
be forced to consider what level of artistic appeal that object may
have to the reasonable observer, and whether that level of appeal is
sufficient to create a concept independent of the object's utilitarian
purpose. Copyright law should be wary of any test which grants or
denies protection on the basis of the reasonable observer's judgment
as to aesthetic quality. In order to promote the advancement of art, a
society must recognize what is on the cutting edge, and the reasona-
ble observer test recognizes only what is either on its way or what is
already mainstream.24 The very nature of the word "reasonable"
suggests recognition as "art" of that which is not too excessive, eso-
teric or unrecognized as an art form. It is a contradiction to suggest
that the reasonable observer would recognize the most up to date
forms of expression as forms of "art."
Clearly, Judge Newman's test does have some undeniable ap-
peal to it, if only there was a way to take the ordinary observer and
test whether the two concepts (utility and aesthetic) could be enter-
tained independently. At least one scholar has also found Judge
Newman's test very attractive, but unworkable.243 In a thorough
analysis of conceptual separability, Shira Perlmutter suggests that an
adaptation of Judge Newman's test is the best solution.2 44 According
to Perlmutter,
This adaptation would preserve the core of the test-the empha-
sis on the ordinary observer's ability to perceive the object as a
work of art. It would drop, however, the "either/or" aspect-the
additional requirement that this perception be capable of com-
pletely displacing the perception of usefulness. Instead, it would
be sufficient if the observer could perceive of the article as hav-
ing both functions, whether simultaneously or at one time. 48
242. It was also noted by Judge Mansfield that such a test could be met by "a tempo-
rary flight of fancy that could attach to any utilitarian object." Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419 n.5 .
Judge Newman's test probably avoids this pitfall because his test is based on the ordinary,
reasonable observer, which by its very definition is not swayed by "temporary flight of fancy."
Id. at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting).
243. Perlmutter, supra note 21, at 375.
244. Id. at 377.
245. id.
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Although Perlmutter removes perhaps the most ephemeral require-
ment of Judge Newman's test, her test is subject to similar pitfalls.Leaving aside the problems of subjective interpretation of artis-
tic quality as discussed above, 2" an inherent problem with tests
which use a reasonable person standard to determine whether an
object contains an artistic concept is that such a standard is highly
dependent upon the object's presentation. For example, if the Barn-
hart mannequins were displayed in a museum, they would easily
pass Perlmutter's test, because the reasonable observer at a museum
assumes that what is on display is in fact "art." On the other hand,
if the reasonable observer views the same forms in a department
store, the concept of dual functions is less likely. Or even if the rea-
sonable observer viewed the mannequins in a department store on
displaye as both sculpture and as functional mannequins, the likeli-
hood is greater that the test would be met than if the mannequins
were used solely for their utilitarian purpose. Beauty may or may
not be in the beholder's eye, but whether an object is considered ar-
tistic or not by the ordinary observer is often dictated by the manner
of its presentation.2
4 7
C. Brandir: Inquiry Into Artistic Intention
As noted earlier, the Brandir case presented Judge Oakes with
another opportunity to analyze conceptual separability in regard to
useful articles.248 The new test adopted by Judge Oakes shifted the
focus from consumer use or perception to the process of creation.2 9
Accordingly, if the process in which the article's design came to frui-
tion was dictated by utilitarian concerns, then conceptual separability
would not be found.250 Only when the design elements could be in-
dependently identified from the functional requirements can concep-
tual separability be found.251 The requirement of artistic indepen-
dence in this test, although analyzed in terms of the creation process,
246. Perlmutter's test falls prey to the same result that judges will be left with the
overly subjective determination of what the reasonable person's concept of "art" may be. Also,
the reasonable person standard fails to take into account art forms or artistic expressions which
have not yet received popular acceptance. See supra notes 238-42 and accompanying text.
247. Thus, Perlmutter's test is much like the Kieselstein-Cord consumer use test, which
should be employed in determining whether the object is in fact a useful article, rather than in
an inquiry of conceptual separation. See supra notes 94-95, 221-22 and accompanying text.
248. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
249. Id. at 1145.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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sounds much like Judge Newman's separate concept test.2"2 Thus,
the Denicola/Oakes test has two major flaws: Inquiries into artistic
intent are very difficult; and whenever an article is created with the
ultimate purpose to be a useful article, it is doubtful that utilitarian
concerns could ever be completely put aside.
Only in the most clear-cut cases when an artist creates an arti-
cle without any utilitarian considerations, and subsequently that ar-
ticle is "used" without any adaptation, could the Denicola/Oakes
test be passed and objectively applied. In most cases, the ultimate
design of the useful article is a compromise of artistic and utilitarian
concerns. Inherent within the definition of usefulness is the require-
ment that an article serve a function. Thus, a television must have a
screen, a belt buckle must fasten around the waist, and a mannequin
must be able to display clothing. Therefore, no matter the design of
any of the elements, the designer must never completely lose sight of
the article's ultimate use.
Also, just as Judge Newman's test was too subjectively ephem-
eral to be functional, the Denicola/Oakes test is too rigidly unrealis-
tic to be functional. 253 How is the court to determine whether the
designer's intent was free from utilitarian influences, when in actual-
ity most people do not think in these "either/or" intellectual catego-
ries? For instance, how can it be determined whether the breast of a
mannequin was shaped because the designer was only concerned
with its aesthetic appearance, or was influenced by the fact that in
order for the mannequin to function, the breast must reflect reality?
As Judge Weinstein noted in his dissent in Kieselstein-Cord, under
such a test, only the crass would be rewarded with copyright
protection.25'
Under the latest test employed by Judge Oakes, even the belt
buckles for which he granted protection in Kieselstein-Cord, must
have been influenced by utilitarian considerations. The buckles were
shaped to allow a belt to pass through, with a metal notch to hold
the belt in place. Since the buckles were made of precious, expensive
metals, their size had to be at least partly dependent upon utilitarian
concerns. Since the designs of the buckles were not created indepen-
dently of functional influences, they would apparently fail the Den-
252. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 423 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
253. Except in the most obvious cases when the object was first created as a piece of art,
and then subsequently used for a utilitarian purpose.
254. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 994 (2d Cir. 1980)
(Weinstein, J., dissenting).
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icola/Oakes test for separability.""'
Once again, what about David? Clearly if Michelangelo were
creating his sculpture with the intention that it fulfill the use of a
mannequin, the very fact that David would need to be of human
height would be based on a functional influence. Further, how could
a court determine if Michelangelo chose to represent the shape of the
human body in such detail because of purely aesthetic intent or func-
tional influence? Due to the Denicola/Oakes test's failure to account
for the practical requirements that affect all aspects in the creation of
a useful article, such a test should not be accepted.
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Senate Report
The simplest, and possibly the only way to assure that creators
will be encouraged to invent without forcing the Copyright Office
and the courts to apply an extremely abstract and subjective test
would be to follow the Senate's suggestion that all ornamental de-
signs of useful articles be afforded protection for an initial five years,
with a renewal term of five years.256 Such short term protection, ac-
cording to the Senate, would provide for "simple, easily secured, and
effective design protection." '257 By the language of the report, espe-
cially in providing that protecti6n be easily secured, the Senate was
alluding to all ornamentation which lends beauty to the object.258
Analysis would rest solely on identifying the design of the useful
article, and then granting protection for that design. Other doctrines
of copyright law would avoid the grant of exclusive rights to certain
designs. For example, the merger doctrine would prohibit protection
for designs of useful articles of which the design could not have been
made any differently.259 That is, when an idea necessitates a certain
form of expression, then under copyright law, the idea and expres-
sion are said to merge, resulting in denial of copyright protection for
255. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir.
1987).
256. S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., at 161-62 (1975).
257. Id. at 161.
258. Id.
259. See Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458 (5th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 374 (1990). Under the merger doctrine, when an idea can be
manifested in only one form or very few forms of expression, the idea and expression are said
to merge, and there will not be copyright protection for the expression of that idea. See Her-
bert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971); see also 3 Nim-
ME.R, supra note 8, § 13.03[B][3].
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that expression. " ' For instance, the Ninth Circuit did not have to
analyze conceptual separability in Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp.
v. Kalpakian, because it determined that the expression of plaintiff's
bee shaped jewelry pin had merged with the idea of a bee pin.2 1
Since the idea of a bee pin could only be expressed in very limited
forms, the idea and expression were held to be indistinguishable. " 2'
Other requirements for copyright, such as originality, would
avoid over-broad protection. 6 3 Although meeting the originality re-
quirement takes no great artistic effort, this requirement does elimi-
nate common shapes from the ambit of copyright.2 ' A common au-
tomobile tire could not receive protection for its overall design
because the circular shape is common and unoriginal. It should also
be noted that in determining whether the originality requirement has
been satisfied, the overall design must be considered, not a divisional
piecemeal analysis.2" Thus, although a clock may be nothing but a
collection of individually unoriginal numbers, dots, lines, and geo-
metric shapes, if these features taken as a whole show some form of
originality in their arrangement, then the overall design has met the
originality requirement. 6
Therefore, keeping in mind the merger doctrine and originality
requirement, the Senate Report's suggestion seems the most logical.
Provided that the creator of the useful article has met these require-
ments, then a copyright should be granted for the article's design.
This approach avoids the problematic and inapplicable tests that
have evolved for conceptual separability. The Copyright Office and
courts would be relieved of the nebulous task of trying to determine
whether some intellectualized concept of the aesthetic could be found,
or was influenced, in the design either simultaneously or indepen-
dently by the designer or the ordinary observer. In light of the fact
that copyright protection would subsist in the useful article for a
short duration, any harmful results of over-inclusive protection
would be short-lived.2 67 Since protection would only be for a short
time, the thwarting of other artists' incentive to create would be min-
260. See Kern River, 899 F.2d 1458; see also NIMMER, supra note 8, § 13.03[B113].
The rationale is simple: by affording protection for such an expression, copyright would be
acting like a patent by also protecting the idea. See NIMMER, supra note 8, § 13.03[B][3].
261. Herbert Rosenthal, 446 F.2d at 742.
262. Id.
263. See supra note 12.
264. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 2.01.
265. Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
266. See id.
267. S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 161-62 (1975).
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imal, especially when compared to the life of the author plus fifty
years, which is the period of protection normally granted for copy-
righted material.2"8
Another theory of alleviating the problem of over-broad protec-
tion would be to limit the scope of derivative work protection for
useful articles. 6 9 In light of the merger doctrine's narrow scope, in-
tra-industry competitors could be handcuffed by copyrights which
protect ideas which, although potentially manifested in a limited
amount of expressions, are beyond merger. In these cases, perhaps a
sliding scale for the inclusiveness of what is considered a derivative
work would be sufficient. Under this sliding scale, the expression of
ideas for useful articles which barely escape merger would receive
minimal protection by the derivative works right, and those ideas
which have more forms of expression would receive greater deriva-
tive works right protection, up to the usual point of protection for
derivative works.270 For instance, the Barnhart mannequins may fit
in the category of useful articles in which idea and expression are
narrowly beyond the scope of the merger doctrine, and as such the
mannequins would only be protected from unauthorized replication
or near-replication. On the other hand, another party could take the
idea and part of the expression and create nude and clothed hol-
lowed-out chest mannequins, but would have to alter the forms.
Such alterations could consist of a different representation of the
human figure.
B. Gay Toys and Poe: Limiting the Scope of Useful Articles
Although the Senate's proposal is the best solution to the prob-
lem of protection of useful articles, other solutions should be ex-
plored. Since the Senate's proposal was not accepted by the
House,27 1 barring an amendment to the Copyright Act, separating
268. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1991).
269. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1991). The Act defines a derivative work as:
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musi-
cal arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed or adapted. A work consisting of edi-
torial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a
whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
Id. § 101.
270. Under the Act, copyright for a derivative work "extends only to the material con-
tributed . . . and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material." 17 U.S.C.
§ 103(b) (1991).
271. H.R. RF:i,. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 54-55 (1976).
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the aesthetic elements from the functional elements of a useful article
will remain a necessary task. One means of decreasing the confusion
in the conceptual separability test would be to not apply the test for
all the articles which are now considered useful. As the court held in
Gay Toys, simply because the article had a use did not mean that it
was a useful article.272 Perhaps this is what Judge Oakes was think-
ing in Kieselstein-Cord, when he suggested that if the aesthetic fea-
tures are "primary" then conceptual separability exists.273 If Judge
Oakes had shifted his focus and determined that if the aesthetic fea-
tures were "primary" then the object is not a "useful article" at all,
some of the difficulty in his analysis would be alleviated.
Although a shift in Judge Oakes' analysis would be helpful,
any inquiry into "primary" and "secondary" qualities will lead back
to the problems highlighted by this comment.274 Thus, if useful arti-
cles are to be so defined, a different method must be used. Since
useful articles are defined as articles which have an "intrinsic utilita-
rian function," the scope of this definition lies in the interpretation of
what is meant by "intrinsic. '"275 Up until now courts have equated
intrinsic with the article's use. That is, articles which are functional
only in their appearance have an intrinsic aesthetic function,
whereas objects which have a use beyond mere appearance have an
intrinsic utilitarian function.
By restricting the range of "useful articles" within the currently
broad scope that anything which has a use beyond appearance is
considered a useful article, many articles which push the conceptual
separability tests to their inapplicable extremes would be protected
without an inquiry into separability. Perhaps then, after determining
that an object has a use beyond its mere appearance, the analysis of
whether the object is in fact a useful article should be based on
weighing its usefulness versus its aesthetic features to determine
whether the object should fit in a narrower definition of "useful arti-
cles." In weighing these two constants, the Copyright Office or
courts could consider: how much the object's design differs or is simi-
lar from other objects which have the same or similar use; the overall
cost of producing the article, compared to its functional costs alone;
consumer response and use of the article; the type of materials used
for the article; and whether the article is one which is typically
272. Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973-74.
273. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993.
274. Judges will then have to determine either through the ordinary observer or the
designer's intent, which quality was primary and which was secondary.
275. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1991).
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viewed by the public (that is items such as belt buckles which are
worn as clothing should weigh heavily on the non-useful side of the
balance, whereas an automobile engine part which is not manufac-
tured nor typically used to be viewed by the public would weigh
heavily on the useful article side of the balance). 27 Apportioning the
relative weight for each factor would be on an ad hoc basis, depend-
ing upon the object in question. Although ad hoc balancing always
has a subjective flavor to it, such balancing would have a greater
basis in concrete factors than the tests for conceptual separability.
Also, since a determination of whether an object is in fact a useful
article is only preliminary to an inquiry into conceptual separability
(if the article is considered a useful article), this balancing will give a
greater objective foundation for the inquiry into conceptual separa-
bility by forcing the court to consider these factors only under the
guise of "usefulness."
C. Another Standard for Conceptual Separability?
The primary problem with the doctrine of conceptual separabil-
ity is that in its evolution to date, the doctrine rests on abstract prin-
ciples and an overly subjective application. Judge Newman has made
the best attempt to develop a test that would encourage the arts and
sciences without stifling competition.2" What is important to extract
from Judge Newman's test is that conceptual separation can be inde-
pendently sufficient to support a copyright for the useful article's de-
sign.17' Thus, the concept of the design, if sufficiently aesthetic and,
according to Judge Newman, able to cause the ordinary observer to
perceive the aesthetic independently of the functional, would result
in copyright protection for the design.279 As both Judge Mansfield2 .
and Shira Perlmutter 81 remarked, the primary problem with this
test is the inability to determine whether an independent aesthetic
conception could or would exist in the ordinary observer.
Perhaps the only possible way to avoid these nebulous and
overly-intellectualized tests and to achieve a test which has a better
chance at objectivity, is to devise one for which errors occur on the
276. See Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1989); see also supra notes
134-38 and accompanying text.
277. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985) (New-
man, J., dissenting); see supra notes 161-74 and accompanying text.
278. Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 421.
279. Id. at 421-22.
280. Id. at 419 n.5; see supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
281. Perlmutter, supra note 21, at 377; see supra note 245 and accompanying text.
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side of over-protection, thereby encouraging original creation. A pos-
sible approach would be to afford protection for the design of any
useful article which has a design which may be conceived of sepa-
rately from the article's utilitarian function, provided that the design
is non-obvious (original) and the expression of the design does not
merge with the idea of the useful article.282
V. CONCLUSION
Michelangelo's David should be afforded protection, whether it
was created as a traditional sculpture or as a mannequin, and re-
gardless of whether it is displayed in a museum or a clothing store.
When pushed even slightly to their logical extremes, the previously
developed tests for conceptual separability fail to achieve this result,
either due to their esoteric requirements or their dependence upon
improper factors. In light of this fact, either a new test for concep-
tual separability or a new standard for copyright protection for use-
ful articles should be developed.
Since the ultimate purpose of copyright law is to promote the
progress of arts and sciences as a whole, 8 ' any doctrine of copyright
law which bases the protection of an object on subjective court inter-
pretation of artistic merit is in serious danger of thwarting that pro-
gress. Progress in the arts and sciences is the result not of the perpet-
uation of the commonplace, but of the invention of unrealized
expression. If we are unable to strike an exact balance between pro-
tecting original expression and promoting competition, it would be
wiser to error in favor of over-protecting expression. Although too
much error in the name of protection would curtail progress, there
are other means to assure that protection will not reach this extent.
In light of these considerations, the Senate's proposal strikes the most
logical balance between protection and competition, by granting pro-
tection for all designs which give the useful article an "ornamental
appearance," but limiting the protection to a maximum of ten
years.284 In terms of the principals of copyright law, it is questiona-
ble whether a sufficient test for conceptual separability can be devel-
oped. The mere abstract nature of the term itself suggests the inevi-
tability of inconsistency in its application. Although conceptual
separability may be intellectually interesting, neither the Copyright
282. For a discussion of the originality requirement, see supra note 12. For a discussion
of the merger doctrine, see supra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.
283. U.S. CoNs'r. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
284. S. REt'. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 161-62 (1975).
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Office's original creation of conceptual separability, the House's clar-
ification of this doctrine, nor the courts' attempts to apply it have
resulted in a test which can be fairly and uniformly administered; it
is time for this approach to yield to a different standard for deter-
mining protection for the artistic features of a useful article.
Gary S. Raskin

